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1. Introduction
Basel III nancial regulation has had a strong impact on the nature of the banking business,
and in particular on the capital structure of banks. Amongst its features, the new style of
subordinate debt, the contingent convertible, or the Coco bonds, have been much in focus in
recent years. This is an intricate product that either converts to equity, or is written-down/o¤,
when a banks capital ratio hits a trigger ratio. The product has become very popular in a
low yielding environment, as investors rush into such high yield instruments and banks take
advantage of it by issuing a cheap (relative to the cost of equity of the banks) equity-like
instruments that helps bolster the capital and leverage ratios.1 Its market was tested in
February 2016 with the news of a possible default (strictly, coupon cancellation) by Deutsche
Bank, where its AT1 bond2 saw a near 20% fall. Yet by September of that year, $6 billion of
issuance by three banks attracted more than $50 billion in demand from investors.3 The rst
(and so far only) Coco trigger occurred in June 2017 when Banco Popular, a Spanish Bank,
failed and its Coco debts were converted into equity, before Santander purchased them for
e1.4 However, the lack of standardisation in its characteristics, such as the equity conversion
ratio, permanent or temporary write-downs/o¤s, high or low trigger and the embedded equity
option (for equity-conversion Cocos), and its complex nature means that its impact on banks
behaviour is still not well understood.5
The aim of this paper is to scrutinise in detail the characteristics of Coco bond bail-in. Coco
bonds, initially termed reverse convertible debentures (RCDs), were rst recommended by
Flannery (2002). The idea was to counter a rms incentive to use tax-advantaged debt rather
1See for example, Coco bond feeding frenzy sends yields tumbling, The Financial Times, March 26, 2014.
2The European Banking Authoritys (EBA) Bu¤er Convertible Capital Securities Common Term Sheet (8
December 2011) denes additional tier 1(AT1) instruments as perpetual Coco bonds with cancellable coupons.
3Investors grab cocos while the sun shines, The Financial Times, September 1, 2016.
4On 7 June 2017, Banco Populars e500m 11:5% AT1 bond has collapsed 50 points to a bid value of just
5 cents on the euro, while another fell 45 points to 2 cents. (Banco Popular CoCo bonds wiped out after
Santander takeover, The Financial Times, June 7, 2017.
5See for example, Regulators must act on coco bond risks, The Financial Times, May 7, 2014.
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than equity, that also reduces the rms ability to take losses. Flannery argued that the is-
suance of RCDs would still maintain the tax advantage whilst reducing the latter risk. In
more recent terminology the suggested structure was an equity-conversion Coco bond with a
market value trigger. In terms of post-trigger treatments there are two types of Coco bonds:
equity-conversion, and write-down or write-o¤ bonds. In the former, upon trigger Coco bonds
are converted into common equity,6 whilst in the latter, bonds are either partially written down
or wholly written o¤ to cover the incurred loss. In this paper we investigate and compare both
of these. For the trigger mechanism, broadly two types are suggested in the literature: an ac-
counting ratio trigger and a market value trigger. Himmelberg and Tsyplakov (2011), Berg and
Kaserer (2011) and Hilscher and Raviv (2014) are examples of the former. However Flannery
(2014), amongst others, argues that accounting measures trail economic developments when
a rm encounters di¢ culties, and managers can manipulate accounting statements (p235).
Pennacchi (2010), Prescott (2011), Glasserman and Nouri (2012), Koziol and Lawrenz (2012)
and Albul, Ja¤ee and Tchistyi (2013) are examples that adopt the latter. In this case Sun-
daresan and Wang (2014) point out that a market trigger bail-in does not lead to a unique
competitive equilibrium. This problem arises from the fact that the share price reects both
the current value of the rm (say below the Coco trigger value) and the post-bail-in value
of shares (which would then be above the trigger value). Many have sought solutions to this:
Pennacchi (2010) by including Coco bond values in the capital ratios numerator; Prescott
(2011) by introducing a sliding conversion rule; Glasserman and Nouri (2012) argue that
the multiple equilibria problem is a feature of discrete-time models; Albul, Ja¤ee and Tchistyi
(2013) achieve unique equilibrium by placing the trigger directly on the asset value. However
market value trigger also su¤ers from the possibility of price manipulation; as suggested by
Pennacchi, Vermaelen and Wol¤ (2014), the nancial industry justies its objection to Cocos
6Co¤ee (2010) suggests a conversion into preference shares with cumulative dividends and voting rights, for
risk incentive reasons.
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with market based triggers on the basis of... manipulation/death spiral fears. (p550-1).7 In
this paper we follow the common market practice and focus on accounting capital ratio trigger
Cocos.8
The analysis in this paper is twofold. First, the payo¤s to equityholders, vanilla bondholders
and Coco bondholders at the maturity of the bonds are investigated in detail and compared in
the following bail-out/in scenarios: (i) no bail-out/in, (ii) government bail-out using common
equity, (iii) equity-conversion Coco bail-in and (iv) write-o¤Coco bail-in.9 There is a minimum
capital ratio that is set by the regulator, and in each case (except (i)), where possible the bail-
out/in results in the common equity capital ratio being boosted up to a minimum ratio. We
derive at a neat result that each step of the schemes in the listed order can be represented by
a sale of an incremental put-spreador condor-likeoption structure10 from the bail-out/in
providers to the equityholders. As such, the original equityholders are unambiguously better o¤
in the order of the schemes listed. Evaluation before bond maturity, and government bail-out
by preference shares are also investigated as extensions. Berg and Kaserer (2011) undertake a
similar exercise, but they consider extreme and stylised Coco structures with immediate full
conversion. Here we allow partial conversion, and additionally take into account the di¤erent
scenarios for what happens when Coco bonds are exhausted, i.e. when the losses are larger
than the face value of the Coco bonds.
Second, we investigate the incentive problems inherent in these bail-out/in structures.
Agency costs in banking was pointed out as far back as Jensen and Meckling (1976), who
argued that the call option held by the equityholders would lead to asset substitution problem,
resulting in excessive risk-taking and a gambling-for-resurrectionin times of a nancial crisis.
7See for example, Cocotrigger plan draws wary response, The Financial Times, April 4, 2011. Du¢ e
(2010) suggests using multiday average as a solution to this.
8McDonald (2011) suggests a dual price trigger that depends on both the banks share price and the value
of a market stock index.
9Though not formally analysed, the results for write-down Coco bail-in are also included in the paper.
10These structures are described in the text.
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Here we distinguish two types of agency costs. The rst is the wealth-transfer problem, where
the equityholders have an incentive to take on riskier projects because of their positive vega11
of their long option positions12 (call option plus any incremental put-spreador condor-like
options). A choice of a higher volatility of the projectsoutcomes means higher option value,
leading to wealth being transferred from the sellers of the options (Coco bondholders or the
government) to the buyers (the equityholders).13 We compare the level of this agency cost
by comparing the vega curves of each bail-out/in scheme. The second is the value destruction
problem, where in a falling solvency scenario, the equityholders are tempted to gamble-for-
ressurection, i.e. sacrice value for higher volatility. The temptation is higher, the more the
potential gain from higher gamble o¤sets the rm value sacriced. Therefore the level of this
agency cost can be gauged by the ratio of delta14 to vega, where the smaller the ratio, the higher
the temptation. Three main results are obtained: (i) in no bail-out/in or government bail-out
scenarios, both types of agency costs are worse the further the rm value falls towards insol-
vency; (ii) for asset values above the bail-in trigger point, the agency costs are unambiguously
higher under equity-conversion Coco bail-in than under no bail-out/in or government bail-out;
and (iii) for higher asset values, the agency costs are still higher under write-o¤ Coco bail-in
than under equity-conversion Coco bail-in. The latter two are the unintended consequences
of the deviation from absolute priority rules (DAPR), where under the absolute priority rule
(APR) bondholders do not bear losses until equityholders have been wiped out.
There are much related work in the literature. In a pre-Coco set-up, Eberhart and Senbet
(1993) investigates the role of APR violation. They assume the wealth-transfer to be a con-
11Vega is the sensitivity of the option value to an increase in the volatility of the underlying asset price. Thus
where V is the value of the option and  is the volatility, V ega = @V
@
.
12When one buys a security, such as a share or an option, he is said to hold a long position in the security.
Similarly, when one borrows and sells a share, or writes (i.e. creates and sells) an option, then he is said to hold
a short position.
13Basically, here the holder of an option is able to determine the volatility of the underlying asset. If this was
possible in nancial markets, then it would be an illegal market manipulation.
14Delta is the sensitivity of the option value to an increase in the underlying asset price. Thus where V is the
value of the option and S is the underlying asset price, Delta = @V
@S
.
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stant proportion of the rm value, and argue that DAPR can reduce agency costs. In Flannery
(2002) no DAPR is assumed, i.e. the equityholders continue to bear losses while the converted
RCDs replenish the capital base. Pennacchi (2010) builds a model of a jump-di¤usion process
for asset return using Monte Carlo simulations. They investigate the banks risk-taking incen-
tives, and nd that moral hazard is usually less than if it had issued an equivalent amount
of subordinated debt(p3). Himmelberg and Tsyplakov (2011) consider the dilution e¤ect of
a trigger and argue that the bank would have strong incentives to avoid triggering conver-
sion by preemptively de-leveraging and raising equity capital well before it becomes nancially
distressed (p3), while for non-dilutive (write-o¤) Cocos it is incentivised to burnmoney.
Calomiris and Herring (2013) also conclude that the threat of dilution gives the bank an incen-
tive to reduce risk. Berg and Kaserer (2011) is perhaps the closest to our work here where they
too investigate the vega. They consider Convert-to-Steal (CoSt)(write-o¤) and Convert-to-
Surrender (CoSu)(immediate expropriation of equityholders) bonds and advocate the latter
as a vega-reducing scheme. This is extended to a rst-passage time framework in Berg and
Kaserer (2015) to explore trigger before bond maturity. Hilscher and Raviv (2011) derive at a
similar result under a di¤erent set-up (they price bonds as a set of barrier options15), that for
Coco bonds with zero conversion ratio (CoSt in Berg and Kaserer) the equityholders have
an incentive to increase risk, while for Coco with conversion ratio equal to one (CoSu) they
have an incentive to decrease risk. Then there is always an intermediate level of conversion
ratio for which the incentives for equityholders to change asset risk are eliminated. Glasserman
and Nouri (2012) and Albul, Ja¤e and Tchistyi (2013) both price coupon-paying Coco bonds,
former using Black and Cox (1976) and the latter extending Leland (1994), but they do not
discuss incentive issues. Finally, Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) focus on risk-taking incentives.
They argue that debt nancing exerts a disciplining e¤ect on the decision-makers of the rm
15Barrier options are options which can be knocked-out or knocked-inwhen the underlying asset price
breaches a pre-determined barrier.
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from the threat of losing control rights in bad states, and as by construction, Coco bonds post-
pone the transfer of complete control rights,... [they] may distort decision-makersincentives
(p91). In their model both default and trigger occur according to the level of cash ow, and a
trigger results in coupons default that lowers the required level of cash ow before default
(but there is no additional equity). Thus higher risk-taking is benecial to the equityholders,
as it increases the probability of a trigger that reduces the probability of default.16
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we analyse comprehensively the payo¤
structure of di¤erent bail-out/in schemes. In Sections 3 and 4, we investigate respectively
the wealth-transfer and value destruction problems of the agency costs associated with these
structures. Then in Section 5, we give concluding remarks.
2. Comparison of Structures
We investigate in detail the payo¤ structures of the following bail-out/in schemes:
1. No bail-out/in
2. Government bail-out
3. Equity-conversion Coco bail-in
4. Write-o¤ Coco bail-in
In case 1, the rm follows the absolute priority rule (APR), where once the rm becomes in-
solvent the equityholders bear all the loss, before the bondholders become the residual claimant.
In case 2 the APR is still followed, however the government injects capital to ensure that the
minimum capital ratio is always attained, which results in the bondholders position being
guaranteed. With case 3, the bail-in is triggered when the capital ratio is below a trigger
level, in which case a necessary amount of the Coco bond is converted into equity to attain a
16Various alternatives to Coco bonds have also been suggested, including Bolton and Samama (2012) (Capital
Access Bonds), Bulow and Klemperer (2013) (Equity Recourse Notes) and Pennacchi, Vermaelen and Wol¤
(2014) (Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertibles). Flannery (2014) gives a comprehensive review of the
literature.
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minimum capital ratio. This now represents a deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR).
Case 4 is the more extreme cases of DAPR, where the Coco bonds are wholly written o¤ to
cover the loss.
2.1. Set-up and Assumptions
Consider a simple rm nanced by common equity capital and discount bonds (vanilla or Coco)
with maturity T . The total face value of the bonds is F , which may include equity-conversion
Coco bond (face value FC) or write-o¤ Coco bond (face value FW ). The face value of the plain
vanilla bond is FB. Therefore the rm can have either F = FB (no bail-out/in or government
bail-out), F = FB + FC (equity-conversion Coco bond bail-in) or F = FB + FW (write-o¤
bond bail-in). The equity value at time 0 is E0. The total asset value at time T is VT . All
bail-outs / bail-ins trigger at the trigger capital ratio  > 0. There exists a minimum capital
ratio E set by the regulator, where E >  . In all cases, where possible, when bailed-out/in the
equity is boosted to this minimum capital ratio E. In the following analysis, for the numerical
examples the following parameter values are used when relevant: F = 90, FC = 20, FW = 20,
 = 7% and E = 10%. The initial book value of equity is E0 = 20 and the initial asset value
is V0 = 110.
For the purpose of this analysis, we make following two assumptions:
1. For the main body of this section, we review the payo¤ structures and the solvency of
the rm at the bond maturity T .
2. Where government bail-out is required, this will be done by common equity.
Both of these assumptions are relaxed in Section 2.7, where the rm is reviewed at t  T
and preference share bail-out is considered.
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Figure 1: Payo¤s for Equityholders (EE) and Bondholders (DB) with No Bail-out/in: F = 90
2.2. No Bail-out/in
This is the standard case of absolute priority rule (APR), where at the bond maturity T
the initial losses are borne by the equityholders, and the bondholders become the residual
claimant once the equityholders are wiped out. It is well established in the literature that
the equityholders hold a call option at strike price F , while the bondholdersposition is the
bond minus a put option of the same strike price. The payo¤s to bondholders (DNB ) and
equityholders (ENE ) can be summarised as,
DNB = min [VT ; F ]
ENE = max [VT   F; 0] .
(1)
These are depicted in Fig.1 when F = 90. The Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) valuation of the
debt and equity holdings at time t = 0 are,17
V NDB = Fe
 rT   P (F )
V NEE = C (F )
(2)
17See for example Merton (1974).
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where C (K) and P (K) are the prices of call and put European options with strike price K,
C (K) = V0N (d1 (K)) Ke rTN (d2 (K))
P (K) =  V0N ( d1 (K)) +Ke rTN ( d2 (K))
with d1 (K) =
ln

V0
K

+

r+
2
2

T

p
T
, d2 (K) = d1   
p
T ,
(3)
and r is the risk-free rate, T is the options time to maturity and  is the asset volatility.
Note using the put-call parity18 V NEE is equivalent to,
V NEE = VT   Fe rT + P (F ) . (4)
In other words, when VT < F the equityholdersposition is protected by the put option P (F )
sold inherently by the bondholders. This is the consequence of the limited liability.
2.3. Government Bail-out
Next, consider the case of government bail-out. This is assumed to be triggered when the
capital ratio VT FVT falls below a threshold level  . The bail-out occurs in the form of an
injection of common shares,19 the extent of which is such that the balance sheet is restored to
the level where a minimum capital ratio E is reattained. With the bondholders fully protected
at their face value F , this would be V = F1 E . For VT  F , the original equityholders
position is wiped out while the government continues to bail out the bondholders, with the tax
payers bearing the remaining loss. Fig.2 depicts the payo¤s of the bondholders (DBOB ) and the
equityholders (EBOE ), which are given by,
DBOB = F
EBOE = max [VT   F; 0] ,
(5)
18See, for example, Hull (2017).
19The case for preference share injection is explored in Section 2.7.
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Figure 2: Payo¤s for Equityholders (EE) and Bondholders (DB) with Government Bail-out:
F = 90, E = 10%
the BSM valuation of which are,
V BODB = Fe
 rT
V BOEE = C (F ) .
(6)
Comparing Eq.(6) with Eq.(2) suggests that the government bail-out provides a put option
P (F ) to the bondholders, but the equityholders gain no benet from the bail-out. This is only
so as we are currently considering the payo¤s at the bond maturity T . Section 2.7 relaxes
this assumption and considers the case where the rms solvency is reviewed at t  T , in
which case the equityholders also benet from the bail-out in cases where the rm is otherwise
insolvent. Note also that compared to the no bail-out/in case, the government (i.e. the tax
payers) replaces the bondholders as the provider of the hedge put P (F ) to the equityholders.
As seen in the next sections, the Coco bail-in schemes are designed to replace back the hedge
provider from the government to the bondholders.
2.4. Equity-conversion Coco Bail-in
Next, we consider bail-in by equity-conversion contingent convertible (Coco) bonds. As with
the bail-out case, the bail-in is triggered when the capital ratio falls below  to restore the
ratio to the minimum capital ratio E. However, in contrast to the government bail-out case,
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there is no external capital injection and therefore the balance sheet remains depleted.
Here we investigate in detail the stakeholderspayo¤s for di¤erent outcomes of VT . Firstly,
for VT  F+E0, the balance sheet has expanded, while when F1   VT < V0, the equityholders
bear all of the loss according to the APR. In both cases, the bondholders receive their face
value, DB = F , and the equityholders receive the remainder, EE = VT   F .
For VT < F1  , the Coco bail-in would be triggered. Then,
 The equityholders take the loss up to VT .
 With the minimum capital ratio requirement of E, the Coco bond is partially or wholly
converted to make up the remaining required capital of EC = (E   )VT .
 When there is enough Coco bond to cover the loss, then DC = (1  E)VT   FB (the
total debt level minus the plain vanilla bond) of the Coco bond is left unconverted. As
a result the Coco bondholders bear the loss equal to FC   (EC +DC) = F   (1  )VT .
This would be the case when there is enough Coco bond to cover the loss, i.e. DC  0,
VT  FB1 E . To demonstrate, take the example of VT = 80 where the rm loses 30. Without
the bail-in the equityholders are wiped out. Instead they bear a loss up to the trigger point,
i.e. EE = VT = 80  7% = 5:6, implying a loss of E0   EE = 20   5:6 = 14:4. The
Coco bond is partially converted to make up the shortfall for the minimum capital ratio, and
therefore EC = (E   )VT = (0:1  0:07)  80 = 2:4. This leaves DC = (1  E)VT   FB =
(1  0:1) 80  70 = 2 of the Coco bond unconverted, so the Coco bondholders bear the loss
of FC   (DC + EC) = 20  (2 + 2:4) = 15:6. The plain vanilla bondholders are una¤ected.
For VT <
FB
1 E , even with the whole conversion of the Coco bond the minimum equity
ratio cannot be attained. For example when VT = 76 <
FB
1 E =
70
1 0:10 = 77:78, the rm loses
V0 VT = 110 76 = 34. As before the equityholders bear the loss up to EE = VT = 767% =
5:32, with a loss of E0   EE = 20  5:32 = 14:68. The Coco bond is converted in its entirety
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into EC = VT (EE +DB) = 76 (70 + 5:32) = 0:68 of equity, and therefore they bear the loss
of FC   EC = 20   0:68 = 19:32. The capital ratio EE+ECVT = 5:32+0:6896 = 7:89% is now below
the minimum capital ratio of 10%; however the rm is unable to attain this even with the full
Coco conversion. This would be the case as long as VT  FB1  , when EC = (1  )VT  FB  0.
For VT <
FB
1  , the Coco bond is wiped out, i.e. DC = EC = 0. There are now at least
three di¤erent scenarios that can be considered. We could insist on the APR to be reinstated
and write-down the equityholderscapital EE . This would be analogous to the no bail-out/in
case in Section 2.2. Alternatively, as with the bail-out case in Section 2.3, we could assume
that the government would step in to inject common equity. Finally, we could assume that
the regulator will exercise its bail-in power to force conversion of necessary amount of plain
vanilla debt, such that the minimum capital ratio is again reattained. This would correspond
to a repeat of the equity conversion bail-in just described in this section. Note in this case,
any unsecured bond is inherently an equity-conversion Coco bond. In this paper we consider
the rst case in detail, which we refer to as Bail-in-No-bail-out/in, and comment on the latter
two, which we refer to as Bail-in-Bail-out and Bail-in-Bail-in.
In the case of Bail-in-No-Bail-in/out then, for FB  VT < FB1  the equity EE is written-
down, while for VT < FB, the bondholders become the residual claimants. In summary,
VT [0; FB)
h
FB ;
FB
1 
 h
FB
1  ;
FB
1 E
i 
FB
1 E ;
F
1 
i 
F
1  ; F + E0

[F + E0;1]
DB VT FB FB FB FB
DC 0 0 0 (1 E)VT FB FC
EE 0 VT FB VT VT VT F
EC 0 0 (1 )VT FB (E )VT 0
Capital
ratio
0 [0; ] [ ; E] E
h
 ; E0
F+E0
 h
E0
F+E0
; 1

Notes
EE wiped
out, debt-
holders
residual
claimants
EE
written
down
Coco
wholly
triggered, E
unattainable
Coco
partially
triggered
EE written
down.
Capital
ratio   .
Growth
(7)
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Figure 3: Payo¤s for Equityholders (EE) and Bondholders (DB) with Equity-conversion Bail-
in-No-Bail-out/in:  = 7%, E = 10%, FB = 90 and FC = 20
The payo¤s for bondholders, the original equityholders and the Coco bondholders are,
where the Coco bondholderspayo¤ is the total of their bond and equity positions,
DCNB = min [VT ; FB]
ECNE = max [VT   F; 0] +
n
(1  )max
h
F
1    VT ; 0
i
 max [F   VT ; 0]
o
 
n
(1  )max
h
FB
1    VT ; 0
i
 max [FB   VT ; 0]
o
DCNC + E
CN
C = FC   (1  )

max
h
F
1    VT ; 0
i
 max
h
FB
1    VT ; 0
i
.
(8)
Fig.3 shows the bondholdersand equityholderspayo¤s. The BSM valuation of these are,
V CNDB = FBe
 rT   P (FB)
V CNEE = C (F ) +
h
(1  )P

F
1 

  P (F )
i
 
h
(1  )P

FB
1 

  P (FB)
i
V CNEC + V
CN
DC
= FCe
 rT   (1  )
h
P

F
1 

  P

FB
1 
i
.
(9)
Note, we recover V NDB and V
N
EB
when  = FC = 0. V CNEE derived in Eq.(9) di¤ers from the
expression for Convert-to-surrender Cocoin Berg and Kaserer (2011) in two ways. First, they
assume 100% conversion of the Coco bond when triggered. Here we allow partial conversion.
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Second, they assume the whole liability to be Coco bonds, i.e. F = FC , and therefore the
equityholders are never wiped out for VT > 0. Here our assumption of FC < F means that,
once the Coco bond is wiped out, the normal practice of APR resumes where the equityholders
holdings are written down ahead of the vanilla bonds.
One way of viewing the Coco bail-in e¤ect is to regard the di¤erence between V CNEE in Eq.(9)
and V NEE in Eq.(2) as the wealth-transfer induced by the introduction of deviation from absolute
priority rule (DAPR). Diagrammatically, this is the area between the EE payo¤ in Fig.3 and
the normal call option payo¤ in Fig.1. Eberhart and Senbet (1993) also investigate the role of
APR violations in reducing agency conicts between bondholders and shareholders. However
they assume the wealth-transfer to be a constant proportion of the rm value, and argue that
when the rm is in distress the negative vega of the assumed wealth-transfer partly o¤sets the
positive vega of the equityholdersposition, hence mitigating the agency cost incentive. Here
we are able to explicitly derive the amount of DAPR-induced wealth-transfer as V CNEE   V NEE :
V CNEE   V NEE =

(1  )P

F
1  

  P (F )

 

(1  )P

FB
1  

  P (FB)

. (10)
Intuitively, the equityholderspayo¤ is improved by a bear spread -like protection (1  )P

F
1 

 
P (F ) (a combination of a long put and a short put, where the long put has the higher strike),
which represents the DAPR induced by the introduction of the Coco bond. The bull spread -like
structure   (1  )P

FB
1 

+P (FB) (the short put has the higher strike) reinstates the APR
once the Coco bond is wiped out. Together they create a condor-like structure, which we
will call the Coco condor. The payo¤ of this structure for di¤erent values of VT are depicted
in Fig.4.20
In the case of Bail-in-Bail-out, the government bail-out is triggered when the capital ratio
20A condor is created by a combination of either a bull call spread with a bear call spread, or a bull put spread
with a bear put spread. A bull call spread is formed by combining a long call option with a short call option of
a higher strike price, such that the holder of the structure gains from a rise in the underlying asset price. In a
bear call spread, the short call option has the lower strike price. Similarly for bull and bear put spreads.
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Figure 4: Coco Condor Payo¤s for Di¤erent Values of VT
hits below  (i.e. VT <
FB
1  ), with an injection of common equity EG. Analogous to before,
this boosts the balance sheet to FB1 E and the capital ratio to E. The equityholders are wiped
out for VT < FB, at which point the tax payers are required to bear any remaining loss. As
seen in equations (2) and (6), the e¤ect of this is to transfer the provider of the hedge put
P (FB) from the bondholders to the government, thus guaranteeing the vanilla bondholders
position at F , while the equityholders gain no benet from the bail-out, at least when we are
only considering the payo¤s at T . This is seen in Fig.5. The valuations of the payo¤s for
bondholders, equityholders and Coco bondholders are,
V CBODB = FBe
 rT
V CBOEE = C (F ) +
h
(1  )P

F
1 

  P (F )
i
 
h
(1  )P

FB
1 

  P (FB)
i
V CBOEC + V
CBO
DC
= FCe
 rT   (1  )
h
P

F
1 

  P

FB
1 
i
.
(11)
Therefore the equityholders again benet from the Coco condor dened in Eq.(10).
For the case of Bail-in-Bail-in, once the Coco bonds are wiped out the regulator forces
conversion of plain vanilla debt to assure that the minimum capital ratio is achieved. This
means that the APR is not reinstated when VT <
FB
1  in Table (7), and therefore e¤ectively
the plain vanilla bondholders provide a second bear spread-like protection (the negative of the
16
Figure 5: Payo¤s for Equityholders (EE) and Bondholders (DB) with Equity-conversion Bail-
in-Bail-out:  = 7%, E = 10%, FB = 90 and FC = 20
Figure 6: Payo¤s for Equityholders (EE) and Bondholders (DB) with Equity-conversion Bail-
in-Bail-in:  = 7%, E = 10%, FB = 90 and FC = 20
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second term in Eq.(10)). Adjusting for this term in Eq.(9) the valuations of the payo¤s for
plain vanilla bondholders, equityholders and Coco bondholders are,
V CBIDB + V
CBI
EB
= FBe
 rT   (1  )P

FB
1 

V CBIEE = C (F ) +
h
(1  )P

F
1 

  P (F )
i
V CBIEC + V
CBI
DC
= FCe
 rT   (1  )
h
P

F
1 

  P

FB
1 
i
.
(12)
Fig.6 shows the plain vanilla bondholdersand equityholderspayo¤s.
2.5. Write-o¤Coco Bail-in
Next, we consider bail-in by write-o¤Coco bonds. In contrast to equity-conversion bail-in, here
the entire bond is written-o¤ at once for values of VT < F1  . Then upon trigger, immediately
the Coco bondholdersposition goes to zero: DW = 0. Now, it is unclear as to what happens
to the remainder of the written-o¤ bond when the write-o¤ more than covers the rms loss.
Here we assume that the net amount becomes a contingent capital reserve (CCR). So consider
again the example VT = 80 when the rm loses 30. As before EE = VT = 80  7% = 5:6
and so the equityholders bear the loss of E0  EE = 20  5:6 = 14:4, and the write-o¤ bond is
triggered to cover the rest of the loss. Of FW = 20, 30   14:4 = 15:6 is required to write-o¤
this loss, while the remaining 20   15:6 = 4:4 is added to the equity capital as ECCR. The
capital ratio EE+ECCRVT =
VT FB
VT
= 80 7080 = 12:5% is now above the minimum ratio E. This
would be true for values of VT for which
VT FB
VT
 E , VT  FB1 E . For VT below this level,
we in this case assume forced bail-in by the vanilla bondholders. As such, we denote this case
as Write-o¤-Bail-in. In summary then,
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VT
h
0; FB
1 
 h
FB
1  ;
FB
1 E
 h
FB
1 E ;
F
1 
 h
F
1  ; V 0

[V0;1]
DB (1 E)VT FB FB FB
DW 0 0 0 FW
EE VT VT VT VT F
ECCR 0 (1  )VT   FB (1  )VT   FB 0
EB (E )VT 0 0 0
Capital
ratio
E [ ; E] E
h
 ; E0
F+E0
 h
E0
F+E0
; 1

Notes
Forced
bail-in by
vanilla
bondholders
E unattainable
even with the
CCR.
WO bond
triggered.
Remainder
net of loss
added as CCR.
E not breached.
EE written
down.
Capital
ratio   .
Growth
(13)
In an actual trigger event, it is unclear who would own the contingent capital reserve.
Assuming here that it is transferred to the equityholders, the payo¤s can be summarised as,
DWOBIB + E
WOBI
B = min [(1  )VT ; FB]
EWOBIE + E
WOBI
CCR = VT   F + FWVT F1  + (1  )max
h
FB
1    VT ; 0
i
DWOBIW = FWVT> F1 
,
(14)
where VT> F1 
=
8>><>>:
1 if VT > F1 
0 if VT  F1 
is an indicator function. Fig.7 shows the bondholders
and equityholderspayo¤s. The BSM valuation of the debt and equity holdings at time t = 0
are,
V WOBIDB + V
WOBI
EB
= FBe
 rT   (1  )P

FB
1 

V WOBIEE + V
WOBI
ECCR
= C (F ) + FWBP

F
1 

 
h
P (F )  P

FB
1 
i
V WOBIDW = FwBC

F
1 

.
(15)
where BC (K) and BP (K) are the price of binary call and put options with unit payout at
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Figure 7: Payo¤s for Equityholders (EE + ECCR) and Bondholders (DB) with Write-down-
Bail-in:  = 7%, E = 10%, FB = 90 and FW = 20
strike K,21
BC (K) = e
 rTN (d2 (K))
BP (K) = e
 rTN ( d2 (K)) .
(16)
The equityholdersposition V WOBIEE +V
WOBI
ECCR
in Eq.(15) di¤ers from the expression for Convert-
to-steal Coco in Berg and Kaserer (2011), in that here the trigger point is at F1  and that
there is a forced bail-in by the vanilla bondholders at FB1  .
Analogous to the Coco bail-in analysis, the di¤erence between V WOBIEE +V
WOBI
ECCR
in Eq.(15)
and V NEE in Eq.(2) represents the wealth-transfer induced by the introduction of DAPR:
 
V WOBIEE + V
WOBI
ECCR
  V NEE = FWBP  F1  

 

P (F )  P

FB
1  

. (17)
This we call a Write-o¤ condor, the payo¤ of which for di¤erent values of VT are depicted in
Fig.8.
21A binary option (call and put) pays out 1 if the option is in-the-money and 0 if it is not.
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Figure 8: Write-o¤ Condor Payo¤s for Di¤erent Values of VT
2.6. Analysis
The BSM valuations of the equityholderspositions in Eqs.(2), (6), (9), (11), (12) and (15) are
summarised below, but with C (F ) replaced with V0   Fe rT + P (F ) using put-call parity:
No Bail-out/in V0   Fe rT + P (F )
Bail-out V0   Fe rT + P (F )
Bail-in-No-bail-out/in V0   Fe rT + (1  )P

F
1 

 
h
(1  )P

FB
1 

  P (FB)
i
Bail-in-Bail-out V0   Fe rT + (1  )P

F
1 

 
h
(1  )P

FB
1 

  P (FB)
i
Bail-in-Bail-in V0   Fe rT + (1  )P

F
1 

Write-o¤-Bail-in V0   Fe rT +
h
FWBP

F
1 

+ (1  )P

FB
1 
i
.
(18)
Writing these in this way claries the protection each scheme o¤ers to the equityholders. For
example, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, in both the no-bail-out/in and bail-out cases
the equityholders are protected by a put option with strike price F . On the other hand with
equity-conversion bail-in-bail-in, the equityholdersprotection is by 1   unit of a put option
with a higher strike price F1  . These protections are plotted respectively in Figs 9 and 10. For
example in Fig.9, for no bail-out/in case, the familiar payo¤ curve for put option is shown with
21
Figure 9: EquityholdersProtections for No Bail-out/in, Government Bail-out and Equity-
conversion Bail-in
Figure 10: EquityholdersProtections for Write-down-Bail-in and Write-o¤-Bail-in
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strike price F . For bail-in-bail-in, the strike price is higher at F1  , but the slope of the payo¤
curve is atter. The gures clearly demonstrate the increasing protection for the equityholders
in the order of (i) no bail-out/in and bail-out, (ii) bail-in-no-bail-out/in and bail-in-bail-out,
(iii) bail-in-bail-in, (iv) write-down-bail-in22 and (v) write-o¤-bail-in. In other words, at each
step there is an extra incremental put-spread or condor-like option structure inherently
sold by the bail-out / bail-in providers to the equityholders. These lead to increasing agency
costs, as will be discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
2.7. Extensions
2.7.1. Valuation before Bond Maturity
As discussed in Section 2.3, the government bail-out provides no benet to equityholders at
bond maturity. This is not the case before maturity t < T , where the bail-out enables the rm
to continue operating as going-concern in cases where the rm would otherwise become gone-
concern. This provides the equityholders with a strictly positive time value of the continuing
option, which is the benet of the bail-out to the equityholders.
To demonstrate this, consider an inspection by the regulator at time t < T . Assume that
in the case of no bail-out/in the rm is closed down if its capital ratio is below the minimum
equity ratio E, i.e. Vt < F1 E . In this case the value of the equityholdersposition at t is,
V NEE =
8>><>>:
max [Vt   F; 0] if Vt < F1 E
C (Vt; F; r; ; T   t) if Vt  F1 E
, (19)
22Write-down Coco bail-in is not discussed in this paper. In contrast to write-o¤ Coco bonds, these bonds
are only partially written-down when the trigger occurs. The protection provided by these bonds can be shown
to be,
V0   Fe rT + (1  )P

F
1  

+ (E   )

F
1   BP

F
1  

  P

F
1  

  (1  E)P

FB
1  E

+ (1  )P

FB
1  

.
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where C (S;K; r; ; s) is the price of a call option given by (3), with the price of the underlying
asset S, strike price K, continuously compounding interest rate r, volatility  and the time to
maturity s. The payo¤ reects the fact that when the capital ratio is below E and the rm is
forced to close, the value of the equityholderscall option equals its intrinsic value.23 This is
not the case when there is government bail-out:
V BOEE =
8>><>>:
max[Vt F;0]
E
1 EF
C

F
1 E ; F; r; ; T   t

if Vt < F1 E
C (Vt; F; r; ; T   t) if Vt  F1 E
. (20)
Upon inspection, if the capital ratio is less than E, the government injects common equity
EG to boost the asset value to F1 E . The total equity EE + EG is then
E
1 EF . The market
value of this total equity is C

F
1 E ; F; r; ; T   t

, with the original equityholders holding a
share max[Vt F;0]E
1 EF
of it. This represents the dilution resulting from the common equity capital
injection. Now V BOE > V
N
E unambiguously, as,
max [Vt   F; 0]
E
1 EF
C

F
1  E ;F; r; ; T   t

> max [Vt   F; 0] (21)
, C

F
1  E ;F; r; ; T   t

>
E
1  EF ,
where E1 EF =
F
1 E  F is the intrinsic value of C

F
1 E ; F; r; ; T   t

. This clearly illustrates
the equityholdersbenet from the government bail-out, which is their share max[Vt F;0]E
1 EF
of the
time value C

F
1 E ; F; r; ; T   t

  E1 EF of the continuing call option.
2.7.2. Preference Shares
So far the government bail-out has been assumed to be conducted by an injection of common
equity only. Here we extend this to include preference shares injection. We assume a minimum
23An options value at t  T consists of two elements: its intrinsic value (its payout if exercised today) and
its time value (the value of continuing the option).
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common equity oor EC < E, where the governments preference shares EP are utilised
to attain the minimum capital ratio E, while the governments common equity bail-out EG
is used to maintain EC . The former kicks in if the common equity ratio is below  , with
EP boosting the asset value to F1 E and the total equity to
E
1 EF , as before. Then EP =
E
1 EF   (Vt   F ) = 11 EF   Vt. The latter kicks in if the common equity ratio, even after the
preference share injection, is below the minimum common equity ratio EC , which occurs when
Vt F
F
1 E
< EC , Vt < 1 E+EC1 E F . Then the equityholdersvalues at t < T are,
V BOEE =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
max[Vt F;0]
EC
1 EF
C

F
1 E ;
1 EC
1 E F; r; ; T   t

if Vt <
1 E+EC
1 E F
C

F
1 E ;
2 E
1 EF   Vt; r; ; T   t

if 1 E+EC1 E F  Vt < F1 
C (Vt; F; r; ; T   t) if Vt  F1 
. (22)
When there is no trigger (Vt  F1  ), the equityholdersvalue is the same as under no bail-
out/in. When there is just the preference shares injection (1 E+EC1 E F  Vt < F1  ), then the
equityholdersposition remains undiluted, but their claim at bond maturity T is now on the
asset value VT minus the sum of the bond face value F and the preference shares principal
F
1 E   Vt. The strike price of the call option is therefore F + F1 E   Vt = 2 E1 EF   Vt. Finally,
when there is also common equity injection (Vt <
1 E+EC
1 E F ), then the equityholdersshare of
equity is diluted to max[Vt F;0]EC
1 EF
, where EC1 EF is the total common equity after bail-out. Their
claim at T is on VT F minus the maximum preference share injection of E EC1 E F , and therefore
the strike price of the call option is F + E EC1 E F =
1 EC
1 E F .
Using preference shares instead of common shares in order to attain the minimum equity
ratio E has two opposing e¤ects on the equityholdersposition. The positive e¤ect is that of
smaller (or no) dilution. Specically, compared to Eq.(20), in Eq.(22) when 1 E+EC1 E F  Vt <
F
1  there is no dilution (only preference shares are injected), while when Vt <
1 E+EC
1 E F the
dilution is smaller (there is less common equity injected). The negative e¤ect is that of reduced
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Figure 11: Value of equityholdersposition V BOEE for di¤erent values of Vt with and without
preference shares
claim on the asset due to higher ranking of the preference shares. This is reected in the higher
strike price of the call options in Eq.(22) (note, 2 E1 EF   Vt > F for Vt < F1 E ), which reduces
the option value. Fig.11 shows that, when F = 90, E = 10%, EC = 5%, r = 5%,  = 20%
and T   t = 0:5, the positive e¤ect of smaller dilution outweighs the negative e¤ect of smaller
claim. Indeed, it can be shown that this is always the case:
Proposition 1 V BOEE is unambiguously higher with preference shares than without.
Proof. Note when EC = E, the curves coincide in Fig.11. Therefore it su¢ ces to show that
the gap between the two curves at Vt =
1 E+EC
1 E F (the kink of the preference shares curve)
increases as EC decreases, or
@
@EC

C

F
1  E ;
1  EC
1  E F; r; ; T   t

  EC
E
C

F
1  E ;F; r; ; T   t

< 0
, F
1  Ee
 r(T t)N

d2

F
1  E ;
1  EC
1  E F; r; ; T   t

<
1
E
C

F
1  E ;F; r; ; T   t

.
(23)
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But N

d2

F
1 E ;
1 EC
1 E F; :::

< N

d2

F
1 E ; F; :::

, and so it su¢ ces to show that,
E
1  EFe
 r(T t)N

d2

F
1  E ;F; r; ; T   t

< C

F
1  E ;F; r; ; T   t

, E
1  EFe
 r(T t)N (d2 (:)) <
F
1  EN (d1 (:))  Fe
 r(T t)N (d2 (:)) (24)
, e r(T t)N (d2 (:)) < N (d1 (:)) .
This is true as N (d2 (:)) < N (d1 (:)), since d1 = d2 + 
p
T   t. Therefore as EC decreases
below E, the equityholders are unambiguously better o¤ with preference shares bail-out.
3. Agency Cost: Wealth-Transfer Problem
Having established the details of the di¤erent bail-out/in structures, we now investigate the
agency costs associated with the over-investment problems in these structures. We distinguish
two types of such agency costs:
1. Wealth-transfer problem. This is when the equityholders have an incentive for higher
risk-taking, represented by the vega of their option position.
2. Value-destruction. Eberhart and Senbet (1993) state, Risk-shifting can enhance equity
value even when higher risk projects are of lower value, implying that investment decisions
can be distorted away from rm value maximisation.When negative NPV projects are
still benecial to the equityholders (due to their convex payo¤ and the projects higher
volatility), the reduction in the rms total value represents this type of agency cost.
We investigate these in turn in this section and the next. For the purpose of the technical
analyses, we assume r > 
2
2 for the remainder of the paper.
As common in the literature (e.g. Eberhart and Senbet (1993); Berg and Kaserer (2011)),
we investigate the vega of the equityholder position as a measure of their incentive to take on
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Figure 12: Equityholdersvega for di¤erent values of V0 when F = 90, FC = FW = 20,  = 7%
and E = 10%
riskier projects. The vega for each of the above cases are,
V egaNEE = V ega
BO
EE
= V0
p
TN 0 (d1 (F ))
V egaCNEE = V ega
CBO
EE
= V0
p
T
h
(1  )N 0

d1

F
1 

  (1  )N 0

d1

FB
1 

+N 0 (d1 (FB))
i
V egaCBIEE = (1  )V0
p
TN 0

d1

F
1 

V egaWOBIEE =
1
d1

F
1 

FW e
 rTN 0

d2

F
1 

+ (1  )V0
p
TN 0

d1

FB
1 

,
(25)
where N 0 (d1 (K)) = 1p2e
  [d1(K)]2
2 for strike price K. These are depicted in Fig.12.24 The
graph compares the incentives for the equityholders to take on riskier projects at di¤erent
values of V0 above F between the ve structures. We make the following observations:
24Write-down Coco bond is not discussed in the paper (see footnote 22). The vega of the equityholders
position in the case of write-down-bail-in is given by,
V egaWDBIEE = V0
p
T

(1  E)N 0

d1

F
1  

  (1  E)N 0

d1

FB
1  E

+ (1  )N 0

d1

FB
1  

+
1

d1

F
1  

(E   ) F
1   e
 rTN 0

d2

F
1  

.
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Proposition 2 With no bail-out/in or government bail-out, the incentive for higher risk taking
increases as the rms asset value falls towards the critical value F .
In Fig.12 the critical value for no bail-out/in is F = 90. This is a restatement of a
well-established fact in option theory that the vega of a call option increases as the option
approaches at-the-money (i.e. V0 = F ). As such the proof is omitted.
The wealth-transfer happens when the equityholders choose higher  projects, due to their
positive vega values, which results in an increase in the value of their call option C (F ). In the
no bail-out/in case there is an equal fall in the value of the bondholdersposition, due to the rise
in the value of their short put option position P (F ). Thus the wealth is transferred from the
bondholders to the equityholders by the equityholdersactions. For the government bail-out
case the wealth-transfer is from the government (i.e. the tax payers) to the equityholders.
Proposition 3 For asset values above trigger point, the risk-taking incentive is higher with
equity-conversion Coco bail-in than under no bail-out/in or the government bail-out.
Proof. We show this for the case of bail-in-bail-in, which would be true if V egaCBIEE > V ega
BO
EE
for V0 > F1  , or
(1  )V0
p
TN 0

d1

F
1  

> V0
p
TN 0 (d1 (F )) for V0 >
F
1   . (26)
This is proved in Appendix A. Note Fig.12 also depicts that this is true for the bail-in-no-bail-
in/out and bail-in-bail-out cases.
Proposition 4 For higher asset values the risk-taking incentive is higher with the write-o¤
Coco bond than with the equity-conversion Coco bond.
Proof. For this we require V egaWOBIEE > V ega
CBI
EE
for su¢ ciently large V0. It su¢ ces to show
that 1d1

F
1 

FW e
 rTN 0

d2

F
1 

> (1  )V0
p
TN 0

d1

F
1 

for large V0. Note from
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the property of Black-Scholes option pricing model that V0N 0 (d1 (K)) = Ke rTN 0 (d2 (K))
for strike price K. Then we require,
1

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
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1  

FW
F
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)V0N 0
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
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1  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> (1  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
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
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T
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1   e
 
h
r 

F
Fw
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2

2
i
T
. (27)
Thus V egaWOBIEE is unambiguously larger than V ega
CBI
EE
for V0 higher than F1  e
 
h
r 

F
Fw
  1
2

2
i
T
.
For our numerical example, the expression on the right-hand side of Eq.(27) equals 102:25.
The result of Proposition 4 can be checked in Fig.12. Note, in the diagram, that the vega
for the write-o¤ case is lower even than for no bail-out/in closer to the Coco trigger point
( F1  = 96:77). This reects the shape of the vega curve of the write-o¤ condor structure in
Fig.8, due to its right-angle kink at V0 = F1  , where su¢ ciently to the left of
F
1  the vega of
the structure takes a negative value when the holders of the write-o¤ condor (the equityholders)
benet from lower volatility (i.e. increasing the chance of remaining to the left of F1  ).
To conclude, using the detailed analysis of the bail-out/in structures outlined in Section
2, in this section we have been able to establish that, in comparison to the no bail-out/in or
government bail-out cases, the equity-conversion Coco bond exacerbates the wealth-transfer
element of the agency cost for all rm values above the Coco trigger point, and that the e¤ect
is even larger for the write-o¤ Coco bonds for larger values of V0. In option trading terms,
this is analogous to the holder of an option having the right to determine the volatility of the
underlying asset price. In nancial markets, this would be an illegal manipulation.
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4. Value Destruction
Value destruction agency cost occurs when the equityholders do not follow value maximisation
for the rm. This is a principal-agent problem where the interest of the decision makers (the
equityholders) does not align with that of the rm.
To investigate this, let there be a discrete set of projects dened by their expected outcome
E

V iT

and the return volatility i. Let the market price of risk be . Then the present value
of each project is,
V i0 = e
 riTE

V iT

, where ri = rf + i (28)
where ri is the required rate of return of project i and rf is the risk-free rate. Under value
maximisation the rm would choose project m such that,
V m0 = max
i

V i0
	
. (29)
On the other hand, under no bail-out the equityholders choose project mN such that,
V m
N
0 = max
i

V NEE
 
V i0
	
, where V NEE
 
V i0

= C
 
V i0 ; F; 
i

(30)
with C (.) as given in Eq.(2), where the arguments now specify the underlying asset value,
the strike price and the volatility. When mN 6= m, V mN0 < V m0 , and hence there is value
destruction.
The value destruction problem arises from the fact that the rm value is determined as the
expected present value (Eq.(28)) and does not depend on the asset volatility beyond its e¤ect
on the required rate of return ri, while for the equityholders their value increases with higher
 (positive vega of their call option position). Value destruction results when the reduction in
the equityholdersvalue due to the lower choice of V i0 (the delta e¤ect) is more than o¤set by
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the increase in the value due to the higher volatility (the vega e¤ect). The degree of this e¤ect
can therefore be represented by the relative size of the two, which we denote :
 =
Delta
V ega
. (31)
The smaller the  of the structure, the more likely that there will be value destruction.
The delta of the equityholderspositions for each bail-out/in structure are, respectively,
DeltaNEE = Delta
BO
EE
= N (d1 (F ))
DeltaCNEE = Delta
CBO
EE
= (1  )N

d1

F
1 

  (1  )N

d1

FB
1 

+N (d1 (FB))
DeltaCBIEE =  + (1  )N

d1

F
1 

DeltaWOBIEE =    FW e
 rT
V0
p
T
N 0

 d2

F
1 

+ (1  )N

d1

FB
1 

.
(32)
These are depicted on Fig.13.25 We now make the following observations:
Proposition 5 With no bail-out/in or government bail-out, the value destruction is more
likely as the rms asset value falls towards the critical value F .
Proof. It is a well established fact in option theory that the delta of a long call option decreases
as the underlying asset price decreases (in option theory, this is represented by a positive
gamma26). Therefore DeltaNEE and Delta
BO
EE
decrease as V0 decreases. From Proposition 2 we
also know that V egaNEE and V ega
BO
EE
increase as V0 falls towards the critical value F . Therefore
 is unambiguously decreasing for falling V0 above F .
25Again write-down Coco bond is not discussed in the paper (see footnotes 22 and 24). The delta of the
equityholdersposition in the case of write-down-bail-in is given by,
DeltaWDBIEE =    (E   )
F
1  
e rT
V0
p
T
N 0

 d2

F
1  

+ (1  E)N

d1

F
1  

  (1  E)N

d1

FB
1  E

+ (1  )N

d1

FB
1  

.
26Gamma is the sensitivity of an options delta to an increase in the underlying asset price. Thus where V is
the value of the option,  is its delta and S is the underlying asset price, Gamma = @
@S
= @
2V
@S2
.
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Figure 13: Equityholdersdelta for di¤erent values of V0 when F = 90, FC = FW = 20,  = 7%
and E = 10%
Proposition 6 For asset values above trigger point, the value destruction is more likely with
equity-conversion Coco bail-in-bail-in than under no bail-out/in or the government bail-out.
Proof. First we show that DeltaBOEE < Delta
CBI
EE
for the required range of V0, or
N (d1 (F )) >  + (1  )N

d1

F
1  

, N ( d1 (F )) < (1  )N

 d1

F
1  

.
(33)
To show this, consider the following derivative:
@
@V0

N ( d1 (F ))  (1  )N

 d1

F
1  

=   1
V0
p
T

N 0 ( d1 (F ))  (1  )N 0

 d1

F
1  

. (34)
As N 0 ( d1 (:)) = N 0 (d1 (:)), we know from Eq.(26) that this is positive for V0 > F1  . Also,
lim
Vo!1

N ( d1 (F ))  (1  )N

 d1

F
1  

= 0 (35)
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as the limit for both terms are zero. This means that N ( d1 (F ))   (1  )N

 d1

F
1 

approaches 0 from below as V0 increases from F1  , proving that Delta
CBI
EE
< DeltaBOEE for
V0 >
F
1  . We also know from Proposition 3 that V ega
CBI
EE
> V egaBOEE for V0 >
F
1  . Together
this implies that  is unambiguously lower for equity-conversion bail-in-bail-in than for no
bail-out/in or government bail-out.
Figs.12 and 13 suggest that this is also true for the remaining equity-conversion Coco bail-in
cases, namely the bail-in-no-bail-out/in and the bail-in-bail-out.
Proposition 7 For higher asset values the value destruction is more likely with the write-o¤
Coco bond than with the equity-conversion bail-in-bail-in case.
Proof. Again compare the deltas. DeltaWOBIEE < Delta
CBI
EE
if,
 FW e
 rT
V0
p
T
N 0

 d2

F
1  

+ (1  )N

d1

FB
1  

  (1  )N

d1

F
1  

< 0.
(36)
Appendix B proves that this is true for V0 > F1  . We already know from Proposition 4 that
V egaWOBIEE > V ega
CBI
E for su¢ ciently large V0. Together this implies that  is lower for the
write-o¤-bail-in for su¢ ciently large V0 than for the equity-conversion bail-in-bail-in.
To conclude, not only do introduction of equity-conversion or write-o¤Coco bonds increase
the incentive for wealth-transfer by increasing the vega of the equityholdersposition, as shown
in Section 3, in this section we have established that it also increases the incentive for value
destruction by decreasing the delta, hence aggravating the delta-vega ratio . Closer to the
trigger point, this suggests a higher temptation to attempt gamble-for-resurrection, where
the equityholders sacrice rm value for high risk strategies, in the hope for a positive outcome.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The new nancial regulation has been articulated to dampen moral hazard and to minimise
the chances of another nancial crisis that could jeopardise again the integrity of the banking
system. However in reality, the regulator is swappingbail-out for bail-in, which is in essence
a replacement of moral hazard, of banks relying on the inherent guarantee by the government,
with agency costs described in detail in this paper. If the burden of an ailing bank fell to the tax
payers in the past, it will now fall to the bondholders who will be required to be very mindful
about the investments they own in a bank. Historically, apart from the very few cases where the
bank was fully nationalised (e.g. Bankia in 2012; SNS in 2013), the equityholders would simply
su¤er dilution (e.g. Lloyds and ING, both in 2008), or, in many cases, were una¤ected with
the injection of new equity in the form of preference shares with CT1 qualication (Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, etc.). Under the new bail-in regime, the equityholders take the rst
losses up to the Coco trigger point where bondholders get written-down/o¤ or converted into
equity whilst there is still at least 7:0% (the Coco trigger ratio) of assets in equity. This going-
concern deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR) accentuates the agency costs that the
bail-in structure is introducing into the banking industry.
It is, moreover, possible that the new bail-in structure may even aggravate the moral hazard
problem. Although not discussed in this paper, there is, in fact, a second moral hazard problem
apart from that associated with the equityholders, which is that of the bondholders where they
shirk on their monitoring e¤ort when they know that their investments are guaranteed by the
government bail-out. What the new bail-in structure does is to alleviate this second moral
hazard problem, as it forces better monitoring by the bondholders that limits the risk taking
of the banks. However the equityholdersmoral hazard remains, and one could argue that,
in reality, the equityholders may have more incentives to gamble for resurrectionwhen the
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wealth extraction comes from other investors (creditors) rather than tax payers, as the media
scrutiny, and hence the reputational impact, would likely be lower. This factor is enhanced
by the fact that no further shareholdersexpropriation is allowed by the public fund until all
possible bail-in is exhausted, as has been in the recent cases of Banco Espirito Santo, SNS
Bank and Bankia bail-ins. Moreover, bail-in may not result in restrictions on dividends or
bankerscompensations as there would be with tax payer bail-out. In summary, the bail-in
structure solves the moral hazard problem of the stakeholder who cannot inuence the bank
performance rather than of those who can. These are issues not analysed in this paper but they
enhance our case that the new nancial regulation may not alleviate the incentive problems as
aimed.
Traditional corporate nance literature has underscored the detrimental e¤ects of agency
costs on the relationships between bondholders and equityholders, especially due to the limited
investment of the latter. Higher equity advocated by some (e.g. Admati et al. (2013)) does not
attenuate the problem when the equityholders enjoy the put option implicit in the bail-in-able
balance sheet. Higher capital costs on risky investments could potentially make banks safer.
These are broader issues that would be explored in future research. In this paper we focussed on
aspects that arise within the new bail-in world. Wealth-transfer and value destruction are two
consequences of this new structure. To conclude, the new regulations do not solve the intrinsic
moral hazard of the banking industry; instead they yield new unintended consequences.
36
References
[1] Admati, A., DeMarzo, P., Hellwig, M. and Peiderer, P. (2013), Fallacies, Irrelevant
Facts and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Banks Equity is Not
Socially Expensive, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper,
No.13-7
[2] Albul, B., Ja¤ee, D.M. and Tchistyi, A. (2013), Contingent Convertible Bonds and Cap-
ital Structure Decisions, Coleman Fung Risk Management Research Center Working
Paper, No.2010-01
[3] Berg, T. and Kaserer, C. (2011), Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking
and prevent an e¢ cient recapitalization of banks?, Systemic Risk, Basel III, Financial
Stability and Regulation 2011
[4] Berg, T. and Kaserer, C. (2015), Does Contingent Capital Induce Excessive Risk-
taking?, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24(3), 356-385
[5] Black, F. and Cox, J.C (1976), Valuing corporate securities: Some e¤ects of bond
indenture provisions, Journal of Finance, 31(2), 351367
[6] Bolton, P. and Samama, F. (2012), Capital access bonds: contingent capital with an
option to convert, Economic Policy, 27(70), 275317
[7] Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. (2013), Market-based bank capital regulation, Stanford
University mimeo
[8] Calomiris, C. and Herring, R.J. (2013), How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt
Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, Journal of Applied Corpo-
rate Finance, 25(2), 39-62
37
[9] Co¤ee, J.C. (2010), Bail-ins versus bail-outs: Using contingent capital to mitigate sys-
temic risk, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, No.380
[10] Du¢ e, D. (2010) A Contractual Approach to Restructuring Financial Institutions,
Scott, K.E., G.P. Schultz, J.B. Taylor eds. Ending Government Bailouts as We Know
Them, Chapter 6, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, CA, 109-124
[11] Eberhart, A.C. and Senbet, L.W. (1993), Absolute Priority Rule Violations and Risk
Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms, Financial Management, 22(3), 101-116
[12] Flannery, M.J. (2002), No pain, no gain? E¤ecting market discipline via reverse con-
vertible debentures, Scott H.S. ed., Capital Adequacy Beyond Basel: Banking, Securities
and Insurance, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK
[13] Flannery, M.J. (2014), Contingent Capital Instruments for Large Financial Institutions:
A Review of the Literature, Annual Review of Financial Economics, 6(1), 225240
[14] Glasserman, P. and Nouri, B. (2012), Contingent Capital with a Capital-Ratio Trigger,
Management Science, 58, 1816-33
[15] Hilscher, J. and Raviv, A. (2014), Bank stability and market discipline: The e¤ect of
contingent capital on risk taking and default probability, Journal of Corporate Finance,
29, 542-560
[16] Himmelberg, C.P. and Tsyplakov, S. (2011), Pricing Contingent Capital Bonds: Incen-
tives Matter, Working Paper, Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina
[17] Hull, J. (2017), Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, Global Edition, Prentice-Hall
[18] Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), Theory of the rm. Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360
38
[19] Koziol, C. and Lawrenz, J. (2012), Contingent convertibles: Solving or seeding the next
banking crisis?, Journal of Banking & Finance, 36, 90-104
[20] Leland, H.E. (1994), Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Struc-
ture, Journal of Finance, 49, 1283-1252
[21] McDonald, R. (2013), Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger, Journal of Finan-
cial Stability, 9(2), 230-241
[22] Merton, R.C. (1974), On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest
Rates, Journal of Finance, 29, 449-470
[23] Pennacchi, G. (2010), A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital, FRB of Cleve-
land Working Paper, No.10-04
[24] Pennacchi, G., Vermaelen, T. and Wol¤, C.C. (2014), Contingent Capital: The Case for
COERCs", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49, 541-574
[25] Prescott, E.S. (2011), Contingent Capital: The Trigger Problem, Economic Quarterly,
98(1) (First Quarter 2012), 33-50
[26] Sundaresan, S. and Wang, Z. (2014), On the Design of Contingent Capital with a Market
Trigger, Journal of Finance, 70(2), 881-920
39
Appendix
A. Proof of (1  )N 0  d1   F1   > N 0 (d1 (F )) for V0 > F1 
For this to be true we require,
(1  ) e  12d21( F1  ) > e  12d21(F ). (A.1)
Now,
d1 (F ) = d1

F
1  

  1

p
T
ln (1  ) . (A.2)
Hence,
e 
1
2
d21(F ) = e 
1
2
d21(
F
1  )e
  1
2
n
  2

p
T
ln(1 )d1( F1  )+ 12T [ln(1 )]
2
o
. (A.3)
Thus for (A.1) to be true,
1   > e 
1
2
n
  2

p
T
ln(1 )d1( F1  )+ 12T [ln(1 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o
(A.4)
, ln (1  ) > 1

p
T
ln (1  ) d1
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1  

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)]2
, 1 < 1
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
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, 1
2
p
T
ln (1  ) < d1

F
1  

  
p
T = d2

F
1  

.
Noting that ln (1  ) < 0 for  > 1, this is unambiguously satised when d2

F
1 

> 0 ,
V0 >
F
1  e
 

r 2
2

T
, or denitely when V0 is above the critical level F1  .
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B. Proof of Eq.(36) being Negative
Consider the following derivative of Eq.(36) with respect to FW = F   FB while keeping F
constant:
@
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.
The second identity uses a property of the Black-Scholes put option pricing formula, S0N 0 ( d1 (K)) =
Ke rTN 0 ( d2 (K)). This is strictly negative if and only if,
1
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. (B.2)
Analyse this:
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, V0 > (FFB)
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.
This is certainly satised for V0 > F1  when r >
2
2 . Thus Eq.(36) is decreasing in FW for
this range of V0. As Eq.(36) equals 0 for FW = 0, this means that it is negative for all positive
values of FW when V0 > F1  .
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